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Abstract 
This paper identifies how the concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ can 
be applied to the intelligence process to address the overabundance of 
information produced by contemporary technologies. Three tenets from the 
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ are examined as possible remedies for failings 
in the intelligence process. Drawing on previous intelligence failures, the case is 
made that applying the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ will improve the 
intelligence process and allow for agencies to stay on top of the large quantity of 
information they handle. The finding is that by incorporating these tenets, 
intelligence services can improve the quality of intelligence that they produce. 
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The concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) goes back as early 
as the 1970s (Metz and Kievit, 1995), and theorizes that information technology 
is altering the “knowledge available to armed forces, and thus the nature of war” 
(Ferris, 2009, 455). RMA is based on an understanding that information gives 
forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to 
happen at a faster pace than ever before (Lucas, 2010). The definition of RMA 
for this paper is adapted from Betz (2006) and Ferris (2009) to mean the usage 
of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and 
maintain a force’s dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can. 
The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of 
information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for 
commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006; Betz, 2008; 
Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process. In response, 
the question has been asked, if there is a RMA relating to the way information 
and technology are changing war, can the same concept be applied to 
intelligence? This paper argues that the concept of RMA can be applied to 
intelligence to address the issue of information overabundance and the methods 
used to determine how useful information is. This can be accomplished by 
incorporating three elements into the intelligence process: flexible command 
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structures, parallel planning, and real-time decision making. This paper will be 
structured into five sections. The first three sections will examine the three 
elements of incorporation in turn. The fourth section will address potential 
counter-arguments. The fifth section will then conclude the paper. 
Flexible Command Structures 
Flexible command structures refer to a force’s ability to conduct operations with 
“centralized command and decentralized execution” (Ferris, 2009, 471), 
achieving dominance in warfare through rapid reactions. To incorporate this into 
intelligence, a centralized intelligence database that serves as a hub for 
information must be created which allows various intelligence agencies to share 
information and intelligence products (Ferris, 2009). In doing so, agencies 
should be able to provide products as effectively and efficiently as possible when 
ordered to by customers. ‘Centralized command’ already exists in the form of 
the customer who orders specific products (Richards, 2010, 10), so 
‘decentralized execution’ represents the analysts who craft said products. 
Therefore, a centralized database accessible to the whole of a force’s intelligence 
community consolidates the quantity of information and improves how quickly 
analysts can sort through it and produce intelligence, thereby helping forces 
maintain dominance in warfare. 
There are two examples of non-centralized command and information 
causing flawed executions. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, different American 
agencies were producing intelligence products regarding Cuba. But, given the 
amount of secrecy and limited interaction between members of the intelligence 
community at the time, information was not shared between agencies that could 
have helped analysts craft products that in turn would have established American 
dominance in the region (Blight and Welch, 1998; Wirtz, 1998). A second 
example is that during air missions in Kosovo, the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe made a snap decision in the absence of readily available intelligence to 
order a drone strike on possible enemy combatants (Woodcock, 2003, 134). 
These events highlight the need for the sharing of information and constantly 
updated intelligence products to be at the disposal of decision makers, as without 
them they have less accurate information to base their decisions on. 
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Parallel Planning 
Parallel planning is when operations and intelligence are fully integrated with 
one another to allow for continuous evaluation of intelligence as it is produced 
(Ferris, 2009, 457-458), providing forces with the information needed to assert 
dominance quickly. To incorporate this into intelligence, two things must 
happen. First, there must be a centralized intelligence database. Second, the 
function of analysts must change from the current system, where individual 
pieces of information are gathered before being synthesized and analyzed 
collectively in an intelligence product, to a new system where analysts 
“constantly gather, analyse, synthesize, fuse, and update intelligence from all 
sources on all aspects of an enemy in real time” (Ferris, 2009, 458). This allows 
for ongoing adjustments to be made, removing the need for customers to return 
to analysts every time they need updates and reduces the risk of intelligence 
being either received too late or not providing the information needed (Richards, 
2010, 33-34). This efficiency is important because constantly producing 
intelligence allows decision makers to act quickly, maximizing their ability to 
maintain dominance in warfare. Therefore, incorporating parallel planning into 
intelligence helps reduce the burden of information overabundance and improve 
the methods of analysts in determining the use of information by analyzing it as 
it is received and updating intelligence products accordingly. 
The Iraq War demonstrates this well, with two major examples. The first is 
the September Dossier, a publication from the U.K. government regarding 
alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. This was one of the 
documents that led to the Iraq War, but the allegation was eventually proven 
false and has been the source of controversy ever since (Herring and Robinson, 
2014). If parallel planning had been in place and analysts carried out ongoing 
evaluations of information as it was received, it is possible that enough evidence 
could have been found to refute the allegation of WMDs in Iraq and prevent the 
war from breaking out. Although there is no guarantee that this would have been 
the case, the increased speed and efficiency of analysis would have at least 
provided a better picture of what was happening in Iraq. The second example 
comes from the Pentagon’s Director of Force Transformation in 2003 Admiral 
Cebrowski’s reflections on Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cebrowski claimed that 
the intelligence community is limited in its function, as agencies collect different 
sources before producing different reports (Ferris, 2009, 457). Cebrowski also 
pushed for both centralized information databases as well as a continuous cycle 
of collection and analysis as the ideal way to remedy the issues of information 
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overabundance and flawed methods for finding useful intelligence (Ferris, 2009, 
458). 
Real-Time Decision Making 
Real-time decision making is when commanders acknowledge they have enough 
information to act and choose a course of action while still evaluating 
information as it is received, adapting accordingly so they can maintain their 
warfare dominance (Ferris, 2009, 468-469). Incorporating this into intelligence 
requires both a system of parallel planning and “changing the culture of 
command” (Ferris, 2009, 468). The change in the culture of command is the 
certainty required in decision making. Traditionally, commanders have waited 
until they gathered what information is available before choosing a course of 
action (Ferris and Handel, 1995). However, a force risks losing its dominance if 
it waits too long, and, given the effects of RMA, the period one can wait is 
shrinking. This means that decisions must increasingly be made even as new 
information is arriving, which is counter to how decision makers operated in the 
past (Ferris, 2009). This issue be understood through the concepts of Type-A and 
Type-B uncertainty. Type-A uncertainty is an “inability to receive accurate, 
useful and timely intelligence in time to act on it,” while Type-B is an inability 
to act in the presence of too much information as there is nearly an endless 
amount one can know about a situation (Ferris and Handel, 1995, 49-50). Type-
B has become a serious issue for decision makers, but because information will 
constantly be received, it is up to commanders to know when to act even if 
questions remain. Therefore, incorporating real-time decision making into 
intelligence addresses the overabundance of information and the methods in 
determining their use by forcing decision makers to determine when action needs 
to be taken, regardless of the amount of information they have, in order to 
maintain their force’s dominance in warfare. 
There are two notable examples of decision makers not knowing when to 
act: one where they waited too long, and another where they acted too quickly 
without intelligence to back up their decision. Together, these examples 
highlight the need for decision makers to balance informed decisions with quick 
response times. The September 11 attacks demonstrate when decision makers 
waited too long. The literature shows several reports had been produced warning 
of a possible attack which went unaddressed either because policy makers 
deemed the evidence of an attack unlikely or because they thought there was no 
feasible way to counter the threat (Marrin, 2011). Operation Iraqi Freedom is an 
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example where decision makers acted too quickly. While the invasion was 
successful from a tactical perspective, American forces lacked intelligence on 
Iraqi politics and found themselves unable to covertly topple the Hussein regime, 
could not find weapons of mass destruction, and unprepared for occupying the 
country post-conflict (Ferris, 2009, 469). Both examples represent the flaws in 
the current culture of command and demonstrate the need for decision makers to 
re-evaluate when it is appropriate to act. 
Potential Issues 
There are a few counter arguments to the incorporation of RMA into intelligence. 
First, there is debate over the extent to which information technology changes 
the nature of war, and thus, changes intelligence. Some claim that true 
dominance is dependent upon human actors and technology is only a tool to aid 
in situational understanding, while others claim that technology will not result 
in a fundamental shift in war beyond its usage in fighting (Ferris, 2009). 
However, the argument in favour RMA and its incorporation into intelligence is 
stronger because the evidence shows that information technology can provide us 
with a deeper understanding of events than human analysis is capable of (Betz, 
2006), assuming it is handled properly, hence the need to incorporate RMA into 
the intelligence process. 
 This ties into a second counter argument, which is how resource intensive 
incorporating RMA into intelligence would be. With parallel planning, the 
manpower necessary to be constantly gather and evaluating information would 
likely be far more than what is currently utilized and would thus represent a large 
increase in intelligence costs. However, the rebuttal to this is that the benefits 
received from this method of analysis are worth the cost. Additionally, at least 
part of the costs could be addressed by restructuring existing intelligence 
agencies around a centralized information database and cutting the costs of 
hiring separate information collectors and intelligence analysts to produce 
intelligence. 
 A final counter argument is that having decision makers choose courses of 
action more quickly represents a large risk, and making the wrong decision 
threatens a force’s dominance in warfare. However, the argument in favour of 
RMA is stronger because uncertainty will always be present in some form, and 
while gathering additional information before acting does improve a decision 
maker’s certainty, it also gives more time for enemies to act and potentially 
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assert their dominance first (Ferris, 2009). Thus, while some level of uncertainty 
will always be present and there is some risk in acting too quickly, waiting too 
long to act carries graver consequences for continued warfare dominance. 
 One issue that applying the concept of RMA does not address in the 
intelligence process is the human dimension of intelligence sharing. While 
advances in information technology have increased the amount of intelligence 
that agencies can produce, the mindsets and attitudes of actors involved in the 
process still plays a large role in the selection of what information can be shared 
between agencies. While this can be partly addressed by adopting centralized 
intelligence databases, human actors still make subjective judgment calls shaped 
by their personal experiences and individual risk assessments. While applying 
the concept of RMA to the intelligence process does help mitigate the issue of 
information overload, it cannot by itself remedy errors in human judgment. 
Conclusion 
RMA has indeed changed the nature of war, and now we are faced with too much 
information and no way to handle it. Intelligence agencies do not effectively 
share the information they have with one another, which is becoming 
increasingly dangerous as an inability to share the volume of information now 
available prevents agencies from being able to make informed decisions about 
the issues they are facing. This has manifested in constricted analysts who cannot 
effectively do their jobs and commanders who are apprehensive about acting in 
the face of so much information or, at times, a lack of access to the information 
they need most. To address this, we must apply the concept of RMA to 
intelligence by developing flexible command structures in our intelligence 
agencies, adopting parallel planning strategies for our analysts, and emphasizing 
real-time decision making for our commanders. Incorporating these three 
principles into intelligence will ensure that our forces are able to effectively 
utilize information technology to maintain their warfare dominance in the future. 
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